TALIBAN HISTORY AND RESURGENCE

A nice article on Taliban history and resurgence from www.infoplease.com

Who Are the Taliban?

Their history and their resurgence

by Laura Hayes, Borgna Brunner, and Beth Rowen

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The Taliban ("Students of Islamic Knowledge Movement") ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001. They came to power during Afghanistan's long civil war. Although they managed to hold 90% of the country's territory, their policies—including their treatment of women and support of terrorists—ostracized them from the world community. The Taliban was ousted from power in December 2001 by the U.S. military and Afghani opposition forces in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S.

The Taliban's rise to power

The Taliban are one of the mujahideen ("holy warriors" or "freedom fighters") groups that formed during the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89). After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the Soviet-backed government lost ground to the mujahideen. In 1992, Kabul was captured and an alliance of mujahideen set up a new government with Burhanuddin Rabbani as interim president. However, the various factions were unable to cooperate and fell to fighting each other. Afghanistan was reduced to a collection of territories held by competing warlords.

Groups of taliban ("religious students") were loosely organized on a regional basis during the occupation and civil war. Although they represented a potentially huge force, they didn't emerge as a united entity until the taliban of Kandaharmade their move in 1994. In late 1994, a group of well-trained taliban were chosen by Pakistan to protect a convoy trying to open a trade route from Pakistan to Central Asia. They proved an able force, fighting off rival mujahideen and warlords. The taliban then went on to take the city of Kandahar, beginning a surprising advance that ended with their capture of Kabul in September 1996.

Afghanistan under the Taliban

The Taliban's popularity with the Afghan people surprised the country's other warring factions. Many Afghans, weary of conflict and anarchy, were relieved to see corrupt and often brutal warlords replaced by the devout Taliban, who had some success in eliminating corruption, restoring peace, and allowing commerce to resume.

The Taliban, under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, brought about this order through the institution of a very strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law. Public executions and punishments (such as floggings) became regular events at Afghan soccer stadiums. Frivolous activities, like kite-flying, were outlawed. In order to root out "non-Islamic" influence, television, music, and the Internet were banned. Men were required to wear beards, and subjected to beatings if they didn't.

Most shocking to the West was the Taliban's treatment of women. When the Taliban took Kabul, they immediately forbade girls to go to school. Moreover, women were barred from working outside the home, precipitating a crisis in healthcare and education. Women were also prohibited from leaving their home without a male relative—those that did so risked being beaten, even shot, by officers of the "ministry for the protection of virtue and prevention of vice." A woman caught wearing fingernail polish may have had her fingertips chopped off. All this, according to the Taliban, was to safeguard women and their honor.

In contrast to their strict beliefs, the Taliban profited from smuggling operations (primarily electronics) and opium cultivation. Eventually they bowed to international pressure and cracked down on cultivation and by July 2000 were able to claim that they had cut world opium production by two-thirds. Unfortunately, the crackdown on opium also abruptly deprived thousands of Afghans of their only source of income.

Although the Taliban managed to re-unite most of Afghanistan, they were unable to end the civil war. Nor did they improve the conditions in cities, where access to food, clean water, and employment actually declined during their rule. A continuing drought and a very harsh winter (2000–2001) brought famine and increased the flow of refugees to Pakistan.

In the context of Afghan history, the rise of the Taliban—though not their extremism—is unsurprising. Afghanistan is a devoutly Muslim nation—90% of its population are Sunni Muslims (other Afghan Muslims are Sufis or Shiites). Religious schools were established in Afghanistan after Islam arrived in the seventh century and Taliban became an important part of the social fabric: running schools, mosques, shrines, and various religious and social services, and serving as mujahideen when necessary.Cultural and religious basis for the Taliban

Most of the Taliban's leaders were educated in Pakistan, in refugee camps where they had fled with millions of other Afghans after the Soviet invasion. Pakistan's Jami'at-e 'Ulema-e Islam (JUI) political party provided welfare services, education, and military training for refugees in many of these camps. They also established religious schools in the Deobandi tradition.

The Deobandi tradition originated as a reform movement in British India with the aim of rejuvenating Islamic society in a colonial state, and remained prevalent in Pakistan after the partition from India. The Deobandi schools in Afghan refugee camps, however, are often run by inexperienced and semi-literate mullahs. In addition, funds and scholarships provided by Saudi Arabia during the occupation brought the schools' curricula closer to the conservative Wahhabi tradition. Ties between the Taliban and these schools remain strong: when the Taliban were defeated in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif one of Pakistan's largest religious schools shut down for a month and sent thousands of students to Afghanistan as reinforcements.

While the Taliban present themselves as a reform movement, they have been criticized by Islamic scholars as being poorly educated in Islamic law and history—even in Islamic radicalism, which has a long history of scholarly writing and debate. Their implementation of Islamic law seems to be a combination of Wahhabi orthodoxy (i.e., banning of musical instruments) and tribal custom (i.e., the all-covering birka made mandatory for all Afghan women).

The opposition

Afghanistan's civil war continued until the end of 2001. The Taliban's strongest opposition came from the Northern Alliance, which held the Northeast corner of the country (about 10% of Afghanistan). The Northern Alliance comprises numerous anti-Taliban factions and is nominally led by exiled president Burhanuddin Rabbani. Generally, the factions break down according to religion and ethnicity. While the Taliban is made up mostly Sunni Muslim Pashtuns (also referred to as Pathans), the Northern Alliance includes Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Turkmen. The Hazara, and some other smaller ethnic groups, are Shiites. The Ismaili community, which suffered in Taliban-occupied areas, also supports the Northern Alliance.

Although the Taliban called for a negotiated end to the civil war, they continued to mount new offensives. In September 2001, the leader of the Northern Alliance, Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, died from wounds suffered in a suicide bombing, allegedly carried out byal-Qaeda, a terrorist organization with close ties to the Taliban.

The Taliban against the world

The Taliban regime faced international scrutiny and condemnation for its policies. Only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut diplomatic ties with the Taliban.

The Taliban allowed terrorist organizations to run training camps in their territory and, from 1994 to at least 2001, provided refuge for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. The relationship between the Taliban and bin Laden is close, even familial—bin Laden fought with the mujahideen, has financed the Taliban, and has reportedly married one of his daughters to Mullah Muhammad Omar. The United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions, UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), demanding that the Taliban cease their support for terrorism and hand over bin Laden for trial.

The Taliban recognized the need for international ties but wavered between cooperation—they claimed to have drastically cut opium production in July 2000—and defiance—they pointedly ignored international pleas not to destroy the 2000-year-old Buddhist statues ofBamian. However, they made no effort to curb terrorist activity within Afghanistan, a policy that ultimately led to their undoing.

Even after their ouster, the Taliban's brand of Islamist radicalism threatens to destabilize other countries in the region including Iran, China, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. The Taliban's relationship with Pakistan is especially problematic. A high percentage of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns; Pashtuns are a sizable minority in Pakistan and dominate the Pakistani military. Public support for the Taliban runs very high in the Pashtun North-West Frontier province where pro-Taliban groups have held uprisings and sought to emulate Taliban practices by performing public executions and oppressing women.

The end of the Taliban?

In September, 2001, the U.S. placed significant pressure on the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and al-Qaeda in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. On October 7, after the Taliban refused to give up bin Laden, the U.S. began bombing Taliban military sites and aiding the Northern  Alliance. By November 21, the Taliban had lost Kabul and by December 9 had been completely routed.

An interim government was agreed upon by representatives of Afghanistan's various factions during talks held in Bonn, Germany. On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai, an Afghan tribal leader, was sworn in as interim chairman of the government. Karzai initially supported the Taliban and is respected by many former Taliban leaders. In January 2002, the Taliban recognized the interim government.

The Taliban's Resurgence

While many of the Taliban's most radical leaders and supporters were killed, taken prisoner, or fled the country, many former Taliban returned to their homes and continue to work for the Taliban's goals. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, has continued to elude capture.

In 2003, after the United States shifted its military efforts to fighting the war in Iraq, attacks on American-led forces intensified as the Taliban and al-Qaeda began to regroup. President Hamid Karzai's hold on power remained tenuous, as entrenched warlords continued to exert regional control. Remarkably, however, Afghanistan's first democratic presidential elections in Oct. 2004 were a success. Ten million Afghans, more than a third of the country, registered to vote, including more than 40% of eligible women. Despite the Taliban's threats to kill anyone who participated, the polls were reasonably peaceful and the elections deemed fair by international observers.

In 2005 and 2006, the Taliban continued its resurgence, and 2006 became the deadliest year of fighting since the 2001 war. Throughout the spring, Taliban militants infiltrated southern Afghanistan, terrorizing villagers and attacking Afghan and U.S. troops. In May and June, Operation Mount Thrust was launched, deploying more than 10,000 Afghan and coalition forces to the south. In Aug. 2006, NATO troops took over military operations in southern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition, which put a total of 21,000 American troops and 19,000 NATO troops on the ground. In September NATO launched the largest attack in its 57-year history. About 2,000—the vast majority Taliban fighters—were killed in military operations during the year.

In September 2006, Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf signed a controversial peace agreement with seven militant groups, who call themselves the "Pakistan Taliban." Pakistan's army agreed to withdraw from the area and allow the Taliban to govern themselves, as long as they promise no incursions into Afghanistan or against Pakistani troops. Critics say the deal handed terrorists a secure base of operations; supporters counter that a military solution against the Taliban is futile and will only spawn more militants, contending that containment is the only practical policy.

The Taliban rescinded the cease-fire in July 2007 after clashes between government troops and radical Islamist clerics and students at Islamabad's Red Mosque. After the initial violence, the military laid seige to the mosque, which held nearly 2,000 students. Several students escaped or surrendered to officials. The mosque's senior cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz was caught by officials when attempting to escape. After negotiations between government officials and mosque leaders failed, troops stormed the compound and killed Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who took over as chief of the mosque after the capture of Aziz, his brother. More than 80 people died in the violence. Fighting in remote tribal areas intensified after the raid.

In 2008, after more than five years as Afghanistan's leader, President Hamid Karzai still has only marginal control over large swaths of his country, which is rife with warlords, militants, and drug smugglers. The Taliban now funds its insurgency through the drug trade. An August 2007 report by the United Nations found that Afghanistan's opium production doubled in two years and that the country supplies 93% of the world's heroin.

In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Gates warned NATO members that the threat of an al-Qaeda attack on their soil is real and that they must commit more troops to stabilize Afghanistan and counter the growing power of both al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

In August 2008, the Pakistani military launched a three-week-long cross-border air assault into Afghanistan's Bajaur region, which resulted in more than 400 Taliban casualties. The continuous air strikes forced many al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to retreat from towns formally under their control. However, the Pakistani government declared a cease-fire in the Bajaur region for the month of September in observance of Ramadan, raising fears that the Taliban will use the opportunity to regroup.

Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, was killed by a C.I.A. drone strike in August 2009 in South Waziristan, a remote region of the country. He was blamed for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the terrorist attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, and dozens of other suicide bombings. Despite his death, the Taliban continued its resurgence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009. In fact, the Taliban was blamed for the violence that led up to August's presidential election in Afghanistan, an apparent attempt to disrupt the elections and further destabilize the country.
Another nice article is available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/Taliban.htm

DARFUR CRISIS-IMPORTANT POINTS

Courtesy : Wikipedia,http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm,

http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategic-analysis/2004/oct/Nivedita%20Ray.pdf

• The Darfur Conflict refers to violence taking place in Darfur, Sudan.The conflict started in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur took up arms, accusing the government of oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs. There are various estimates on the number of human casualties. One side of the armed conflicts is composed mainly of the Sudanese military and the Janjaweed, a Sudanese militia group recruited mostly from the Afro-Arab Abbala tribes of the northern Rizeigat region in Sudan. These tribes are mainly camel-herding nomads. The other side is composed of rebel groups, notably the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, recruited primarily from the non-Arab Muslims.The Sudanese government, while publicly denying that it supports the Janjaweed, is accused of providing financial assistance to the militia, and of participating in joint attacks targeting civilians.
• 
  
• It can be described as a classic case of socio-economic,political and economic crisis which took the shape of humanitarian crisis because of the insensitivity of the international players and the unwillingness of a totalitarian regime misgoverning the nation.
• While the United States government has described the conflict as genocide, the UN has not recognized the conflict as such.
• On 31 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 which called for a new 26,000-troop UNpeacekeeping force called UNAMID to supplant or supplement a poorly funded and ill-equipped 7,000-troop African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeeping force. Sudan strongly objected to the resolution and said that it would see the UN forces in the region as foreign invaders. The following day, the Sudanese military launched a major offensive in the region
• The government-supported Janjaweed were accused of committing major human rights violations, including mass killing, looting, and systematic rape of the non-Arab population of Darfur. They have frequently burned down whole villages, driving the surviving inhabitants to flee to refugee camps, mainly in Darfur and Chad; many of the camps in Darfur are surrounded by Janjaweed forces. By the summer of 2004, 50,000 to 80,000 people had been killed and at least a million had been driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region.
• Major historical forces behind the present crisis- severe climatic condition prevailing in Sudan, forcing the people fight for possession of water and food.
• 
  
  Until now the efforts that have been made by the UN and the African Union to
  
  resolve the crisis have not borne any fruit. The threats of sanctions that were never
  
  imposed for fear of vetoes by China and Russia which have vital economic interests
  
  in Sudan, have done little to end the atrocities. China is the single largest investor
  
  in the oil industry in Sudan and Russia has interest in selling arms. This volatile
  
  mixture of oil and arms has actually prevented the UN from taking any meaningful
  
  action against the Khartoum government. The recent resolution secured a unanimous
  
  15-0 Security Council vote only by sidelining the Darfur crisis and emphasising
  
  upon north-south peace.
  

THE 15TH NAM SUMMIT 2009

IMPORTANT INFORMATIONS

• Venue: SHARM EL SHEIKH, Egypt
• Theme:"International Solidarity and Peace for Development"
• Issues:Disarmament, international security, peacekeeping and peace-building, human rights and democracy, self determination, issue of Palestinians, UN reform, the world financial and economic crises, food security, development issue, pandemics, civil society, climate change, energy problem, human trafficking, international terrorism and dialogue among civilizations and religions.
• NAM represents nearly two-thirds of the United Nations''s members and comprise 55 percent of the world population, particularly countries considered to be developing or part of the third world.
• This was the first time Ladies Summit was held at NAM to demonstrate the growing role of women in global governance.

NATIONAL POPULATION POLICY 2000- GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

COURTESY: WEBSITE OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON POPULATION

The immediate objective of the NPP 2000 is to address the unmet needs for contraception, health care infrastructure, and health personnel, and to provide integrated service delivery forbasic reproductive and child health care. The medium-term objective is to bring the TFR to replacement levels by 2010, through vigorous implementation of inter-sectoral operational strategies. The long-term objective is to achieve a stable population by 2045, at a level consistent with the requirements of sustainable economic growth, social development, and environmental protection.

	In pursuance of these objectives, the following National Socio-Demographic Goals to be achieved in each case by 2010 are formulated:
	Address the unmet needs for basic reproductive and child health services, supplies and infrastructure. Make school education up to age 14 free and compulsory, and reduce drop outs at primary and secondary school levels to below 20 percent for both boys and girls. Reduce infant mortality rate to below 30 per 1000 live births. Reduce maternal mortality ratio to below 100 per 100,000 live births. Achieve universal immunization of children against all vaccine preventable diseases. Promote delayed marriage for girls, not earlier than age 18 and preferably after 20 years of age. Achieve 80 percent institutional deliveries and 100 percent deliveries by trained persons. Achieve universal access to information/counseling, and services for fertility regulation and contraception with a wide basket of choices. Achieve 100 per cent registration of births, deaths, marriage and pregnancy. Contain the spread of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and promote greater integration between the management of reproductive tract infections (RTI) and sexually transmitted infections (STI) and the National AIDS Control Organisation. Prevent and control communicable diseases. Integrate Indian Systems of Medicine (ISM) in the provision of reproductive and child health services, and in reaching out to households. Promote vigorously the small family norm to achieve replacement levels of TFR. Bring about convergence in implementation of related social sector programs so that family welfare becomes a people centred programme.

DISINVESTMENT

DISINVESTMENT

"To privatize is to drive a two-horse cart. The cart is the enterprise in question. One horse is called Political Goals and is flighty and fickle, the other is called Economics, and is slow and steady."

The role of the State vs. Market has been one of the major issues in development economics and policy. In a mixed economy such as India, historically the public sector had been assigned an important role. However, in the year 1991 the national economic policy underwent a radical transformation. The new policy of liberalization, privatization and globalization de-emphasized the role of the public sector in the nation’s economy. The faculty at IIT-Bombay has been studying various aspects of the New Economic Policy such as financial sector reforms, fiscal implications of reforms, and of globalization.

To date several arguments have been proffered by the apologists of market-oriented economic structures:

§                the government must not enter into those areas where the private sector can perform better

§                market-driven economies are more efficient than the state-planned economies

§                the role of the state should be as a regulator and not as the producer

§                Government resources locked in commercial activities should be released for their deployment in social activities.

It is also contended that the functioning of many public sector units (PSUs) has been characterized by low productivity, unsatisfactory quality of goods, excessive manpower utilization, inadequate human resource development and low rate of return on capital. For instance, between 1980 and 2002, the average rate of return on capital employed by PSUs was about 3.4% as against the average cost of borrowing, which was 8.66%. Disinvestment (or divestment) of the PSUs has therefore been offered as one of the solutions in this context.

Disinvestment involves the sale of equity and bond capital invested by the government in PSUs. It also implies the sale of government’s loan capital in PSUs through securitization. However, it is the government and not the PSUs who receive money from disinvestment.

The fixation of share/bond price is an important aspect of disinvestment. Now, the Disinvestment Commission determines the share/bond price. Disinvested shares are listed, quoted and traded on the stock market. Indian and foreign financial institutions, banks, mutual funds, companies as well as individuals can buy disinvested shares / bonds.......

Disinvestment is generally expected to achieve a greater inflow of private capital and the use of private management practices in PSUs, as well as enable more effective monitoring of management discipline by the private shareholders. Such changes would lead to an increase in the operational efficiency and the market value of the PSUs. This in turn would enable the much needed revenue generation by the government and help reduce deficit financing.

However, to date the market experience has been otherwise. The large national budgetary deficit on revenue account has been increasing. The government has not used the disinvestment proceeds to finance expenditure on capital account; i.e. the disinvestment policy has resulted in capital consumption rather than generation. Administrative costs of the disinvestment process have also been unduly high.

The actual receipts through disinvestment have often fallen far short of their target (see figure). During the period 1991-92 to 2002-2003, the government had targeted the mobilization of about Rs. 78,300 crores through disinvestment, but it could actually mobilize only Rs. 30,917 crores.

Problems associated with Disinvestment

A number of problems and issues have bedevilled the disinvestment process. The number of bidders for equity has been small not only in the case of financially weak PSUs, but also in that of better-performing PSUs. Besides, the government has often compelled financial institutions, UTI and other mutual funds to purchase the equity which was being unloaded through disinvestment. These organizations have not been very enthusiastic in listing and trading of shares purchased by them as it would reduce their control over PSUs. Instances of insider trading of shares by them have also come to light. All this has led to low valuation or under pricing of equity.

Further, in many cases, disinvestment has not really changed the ownership of PSUs, as the government has retained a majority stake in them. There has been some apprehension that disinvestment of PSUs might result in the crowding out of private corporates (through lowered subscription to their shares) from the primary capital market......

An important fact that needs to be remembered in the context of divestment is that the equity in PSUs essentially belongs to the people. Thus, several independent commentators have maintained that in the absence of wider national consensus, a mere government decision to disinvest is not enough to carry out the sale of people’s assets. Inadequate information about PSUs has impeded free, competitive and efficient bidding of shares, and a free trading of those shares. Also, since the PSUs do not benefit monetarily from disinvestment, they have been reluctant to prepare and distribute prospectuses. This has in turn prevented the disinvestment process from being completely open and transparent.

It is not clear if the rationale for divestment process is well-founded. The assumption of higher efficiency, better / ethical management practices and better monitoring by the private shareholders in the case of the private sector all of which supposedly underlie the disinvestment rationale is not always borne out by business trends and facts.

Total disinvestment of PSUs would naturally concentrate economic and political power in the hands of the private corporate sector. The US economist Kenneth Galbraith had visualized a role of countervailing power for the PSUs. While the creation of PSUs originally had economic, social welfare and political objectives, their current restructuring through disinvestment is being undertaken primarily out of need of government finances and economic efficiency.

Lastly, to the extent that the sale of government equity in PSUs is to the Indian private sector, there is no decline in national wealth. But the sale of such equity to foreign companies has far more serious implications relating to national wealth, control and power, particularly if the equity is sold below the correct price!

If the disinvestment policy is to be in wider public interests, it is necessary to examine systematically, issues such as - the correct Valuation of shares, the crowding out possibility, the appropriate use of disinvestment proceeds and the institutional and other prerequisites.

PHISHING

It is  the act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft. The e-mail directs the user to visit a website where they are asked to update personal information, such as passwords and credit card, social security, and bank account numbers, that the legitimate organization already has. The Web site, however, is bogus and set up only to steal the user’s information.

For example, 2003 saw the proliferation of a phishing scam in which users received e-mails supposedly from eBay claiming that the user’s account was about to be suspended unless he clicked on the provided link and updated the credit card information that the genuine eBay already had. Because it is relatively simple to make a Web site look like a legitimate organizations site by mimicking the HTML code the scam counted on people being tricked into thinking they were actually being contacted by eBay and were subsequently going to eBay’s site to update their account information. By spamming large groups of people, the “phisher” counted on the e-mail being read by a percentage of people who actually had listed credit card numbers with eBay legitimately.

Phishing, also referred to as brand spoofing or carding, is a variation on "fishing," the idea being that bait is thrown out with the hopes that while most will ignore the bait, some will be tempted into biting.

SO DON;T BE JUBILANT IF TODAY YOU GET A MAIL FROM MICROSOFT TELLING YOU THAT YOU HAVE WON MILLIONS OF BUCKS.ITS A SPOOF.AND DON'T SHARE YOUR PERSONAL OR ACCOUNT INFORMATIONS.

E-BOOK ON SOCIAL ISSUES

 UPLOADED THE NEW E-BOOK ON SOCIAL ISSUES IN SCRIBD.COM.  BELOW IS THE LINK

http://www.scribd.com/doc/20449045/Compendium-of-Social-Issues